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body, while considering fraud and other serious matters in the 
context of individuals faced with disqualification from 
employment in the financial services industry, is not 
determining criminal guilt. Judges sitting with experts are not 
uncommon in the civil jurisdictions of common law courts, but 
in criminal jurisdiction it is quite a radical step.
JUDGE WITH JURY LATER
It is the fourth option discussed that is perhaps the most 
unusual and marks the most radical departure from our 
accepted concepts of criminal law and the respective functions 
of judge and jury. This is described as trial by a single judge with 
a jury for key decisions. It is envisaged that the trial would have 
three broad stages. The first would consist of the judge 
identifying the issues. The authors consider this would shorten 
the process, because it would prevent the need for pre-trial 
evidential rulings, as the second stage would consist of the judge 
making determinations of fact. At this second stage the judge 
would deal with the factual issues; the authors equate this to the 
present summing-up, but it is obviously far more than this. 
The judge would make findings of fact but would not determine 
guilt. The final stage would consist of the jury being sworn in 
and the judge then explaining the case to them. The jury would 
then be asked to determine whether the conduct amounted to 
dishonesty or whether inferences could be drawn that a 
defendant had requisite knowledge or had behaved recklessly.
The extreme difficulties of this unusual approach are 
highlighted in the paper which acknowledges that the judge's 
finding on the factual issues may need to be supplemented by 
evidence from the defendants explaining themselves, or even 
additional evidence from key witnesses! It would appear likely
that this alternative will be the least likely to receive support.
In the New Law Journal, 20 February 1998, Robert Rhodes QC 
deplored the suggestion of doing away with jury trials for serious 
fraud. His article contains trenchant criticisms of the proposals 
in the Home Office consultation paper. However, serious fraud 
trials do create problems of length and size and it is proper that 
those difficulties be debated. It is to be hoped though, that such 
a fundamental change as denying the right to jury trial would 
only come about from reasoned debate with full regard to the 
rights of defendants. It would be wrong if it came about because 
of certain well-publicised, unsuccessful prosecutions.
There is the added danger that it could be the thin end of the 
wedge. Very complicated evidence can arise in other areas as 
well. In New Zealand there was a highly publicised attempted 
murder trial. It was an allegation of poisoning against a jilted 
lover. Both parties were academics and the victim enjoyed a 
worldwide reputation in his field. The poison allegedly used was 
extremely rare. Experts from around the world gave evidence 
for prosecution and defence. The nature of their evidence was 
extremely complex, probably more so than that given in most 
complex fraud trials. Should cases such as this have some special 
procedure? Why should a special procedure apply only to fraud 
cases with complex evidence and not to other criminal charges 
with equally complex evidence? These are critical questions that 
need to be examined with very great care before something as 
fundamental as the right to trial by jury is lost. ©
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Much could be done to improve existing jury trials, believes 
Christopher Dickson, who looks at the background to the 
consultation document on the future of juries in serious fraud trials, 
and discusses the possible outcome.
The recent Home Office consultation document on the future of juries in serious fraud trials has been characterised by some as an attempt to ensure that the 
high profile Serious Fraud Office defeats of the past are not 
repeated in the future. I do not believe that this is its purpose. 
Contrary to popular perception the Serious Fraud Office's 
record is a good one: most recently a 94.4% conviction rate
since April 1997, with a 'lifetime' rate of over 70%. It is a record 
which stands comparison with those of comparable prosecutors 
anywhere, reflecting as it does some of the most difficult and 
complex criminal cases ever tried. I do not believe it would have 
been significantly different, taken over the last ten years, 
whatever alternative mode of trial had been in operation.
What is really behind the Home Office document is a desire
by the Treasury to contain the spiralling cost of long fraud trials.
The suggested alternatives to the present system, upon which 
comment is invited, range from the eminently sensible (some 
form of additional screening of jurors), through the predictable 
(a fraud tribunal consisting of a judge with lay members), to the 
frankly bizarre (a judge to hear the evidence, with a jury being 
brought in at the end to listen to the judge's findings of fact and 
determine such issues as the defendant's honesty or otherwise).
IMPROVING JURY TRIALS
There is no doubt that much could still be done to improve 
jury trial. First, is there any real justification (other than their 
own convenience) for disqualifying or excusing as of right so 
many apparently intelligent people from jury service? For 
example, barristers and solicitors are disqualified; MPs, 
members of the House of Lords, and practising medical 
practitioners may be excused as of right. These disqualifications 
and exemptions should mostly be abolished (as has happened 
recently in New York state), with judges thereafter being very 
slow to excuse any person from serving on the ground of 
inconvenience, balanced by proper reimbursement of lost 
earnings.
Secondly, whilst I appreciate that it is more easily said than 
done, I believe that some form of screening of jurors as to their 
level of education and/or aptitude should be introduced. The 
principal proponent of this idea has been John Wood, the first 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office and later Director of Public 
Prosecutions in Hong Kong. He has suggested a standard ofo o oo
competence in English and mathematics. Would it really be 
beyond the bounds of acceptability to devise such a standard, 
based perhaps on GCSE A C grades or their equivalent in 
English and mathematics, with a short aptitude test as a possible 
alternative? Jurors in serious fraud cases already fill in 
questionnaires to ensure that they have no connection with the 
subject matter of the case to be tried, so a small number of 
additional questions should not cause any great difficulty.
Thirdly, the American practice of swearing in 'alternate jurors' 
should be seriously considered. Sickness among one or more of 
the twelve jurors is almost inevitable in a long trial, particularly 
during the winter. Most long trials have lost, overall, several 
weeks to sickness, because judges are understandably slow to 
discharge jurors if there is a risk of having to start the trial again 
(the minimum size to which a jury can drop is nine). The 
alternative   adjourning the trial in the hope of recovery   is 
time-consuming and expensive. If a proposal for alternate jurors 
were to be adopted, it would be worth considering whether 
identification of the twelve jurors who were actually going to 
consider the verdict should be deferred until the end of the trial 
(assuming that there were still more than twelve jurors left), 
when there could be a ballot of those remaining. Otherwise, the 
alternates might have no incentive to pay attention.
The most significant antidote to the problems of long trials   
jury boredom and demoralisation   would be a corps of 
pro-active specialist fraud judges, determined to push cases 
along and prevent time-wasting manoeuvres by defence counsel. 
There are such judges, but they are naturally much in demand 
and are quickly promoted to appellate work.
TRIAL BY JUDGE ALONE
The principal alternatives to jury trial suggested in the 
consultation document are either to have a judge sitting alone, or 
to adopt Lord Roskill's recommendation of a fraud tribunal 
presided over by a judge sitting with lay members. Both ot these 
suggestions have their merits. Trial by judge alone (albeit in a 
very different type of case) has worked well in the Diplock 
Courts in Northern Ireland. In part, this is a tribute to the high 
quality of the Northern Ireland judiciary which, like its Scots 
equivalent, has a collegiate quality which comes of being small in 
number. One wonders how the much larger and more disparate 
English judiciary would manage. Criticism of the decisions or 
workings of the Diplock Courts is seldom heard from practising 
lawyers in Northern Ireland, and there has been a notable 
absence of cases giving rise to public concern of the kind which 
have so damaged the English criminal justice system. A particular 
benefit to defendants is the requirement that the judge must 
produce a reasoned judgment explaining why he has reached his 
conclusions. Such judgments have proved more fruitful sources 
of appeal than the simple fact of a jury verdict.
FRAUD TRIBUNAL MOST LIKELY
A fraud tribunal consisting of a judge sitting with lay members 
also has something to commend it. The theory is that the lay 
members would have, for example, particular financial or 
accountancy expertise. The great danger of such an arrangement 
is that the lay members will be tempted to decide cases not on 
the basis of the evidence which they hear, but rather from their 
own specialist experience.
With the present law officers at Buckingham Gate, nothing 
will have been pre-judged. But I sense that Treasury voices will 
be sufficiently powerful to make the fraud tribunal option the 
most likely outcome. This would be a mistake, however 
well-intentioned. First, it would represent a major crack in the 
ramparts of jury trial: it would not be long before politicians, 
with an eye to the bottom line, started to ask: if a man who 
relieved a bank of £lm using a computer was tried by a tribunal, 
why could a man who did the same thing using a shotgun not be 
tried in the same way?
Secondly, and even more seriously, the long-term 
consequences of trial by fraud tribunal would be to impugn the 
very legitimacy of such trials as criminal trials. One (no doubt 
originally unintended) consequence of 25 years of Diplock 
Courts in Northern Ireland has recently been opened to public 
gaze in the prisons of Northern Ireland. Successive governments 
have tacitly conceded that those convicted by judge-only courts 
are 'prisoners of war' whose future will be the subject of 
bargaining in 'peace' talks. I believe the ultimate consequence of 
fraud tribunals would not be 'prisoner power' taking over Ford 
Open Prison (some would say it already has!), but rather the 
decriminalisation of serious fraud itself. When that happens, all 
pretence at deterrence will have gone.  
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